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Abstract 
We put forward an engineering realization method for security protocols. First, a formal description 
language for security protocols is designed. Then, a security protocol interpreter is designed, through 
which the corresponding objective code is generated with the description document as input. 
Analysis indicates that compared with the existing schemes our scheme has obvious advantages. 
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1. Introduction 
Along with the rapid development of network applications, numerous and complicated security 
problems emerge. But the realization of security protocols still remains at the manual realization 
level, which has not been extensively and deeply investigated. Inefficiency of manual coding, a lot of 
repetitive work and high labor cost affects the rate of the whole protocol process. Moreover, manual 
coding inevitably introduces some errors, such as calling insecure functions, buffer overflow, etc. 
Consequently, it is a challenge for programmers to efficiently and securely accomplish security 
protocols coding relying on traditional methods. 
Researchers have made preliminary explorations in this field (for details, see Section 2), but 
they suffer from many flaws. In order to overcome these drawbacks, we set our goal as establishing 
a special engineering realization method for security protocol. In order to realize this goal, XML is 
chosen as the description language based on which a security protocol interpreter is developed. This 
interpreter can transform the XML description of a security protocol into codes. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The second section reviews the related work. 
Section 3 presents the proposed scheme, mainly including the security protocol description method 
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and the interpreter design. In Section 4, the scheme is analyzed. And our paper is summarized in 
Section 5. 
2. Related work 
The earliest scheme involved in automatic code generation comes from the project Athena [1-4] 
by Song et al from the Berkeley University, which includes three sub-modules: the automatic 
protocol generation (APG), the automatic protocol validation (APV) and the automatic code 
generation (ACG). Given a system specification and desired security attributes, APG automatically 
generates candidate protocols that satisfy the system requirements, from which APV selects the 
protocols meeting the demands and finally the codes are automatically generated by ACG.  
The scheme proposed by Millen and Muller in [5] is based on the Common Authentication 
Protocol Specification Language (CAPSL) and the Casper Intermediate Language (CIL), allowing 
automatic generation of Java code from the specification of a protocol written in CAPSL and CIL.  
In the scheme of Abdullah and Menascé [6], a protocol is a set of rules shared by two or more 
communicating parties to facilitate their data communication. These rules have two parts: (1) syntax, 
i.e., the format of the messages to be exchanged and (2) semantic, i.e., the sequence of operations to 
be performed by each party. The author proposed an XML-based language for protocol specification 
along with a process, based in XSLT stylesheets, for automatic code generation.  
The defects of the existing schemes are summarized as follows: 
1). In terms of protocol description language, most schemes are based on formal security analysis 
methods which are not designed for the purpose of automatic code generation and have no ability 
to offer various security operations for users to chose, consequently, they are incompletely suitable 
for automatic code generation. 
2). Most schemes rely on some a specific formal analysis method which can only apply to some 
security protocols. Therefore, their application scope is limited and they are not universal. 
3). In these schemes the users have to master some formal methods, such as the formal security 
analysis methods, thus limit the degree of automatization. 
3. The proposed method of engineering realization for security 
In order to realize the security protocols in an engineering method, we have mainly done the 
following work: First, a description language of security protocols is designed based on XML. Then, a 
security protocol interpreter is designed, which takes the XML description document as input and 
produces the objective language codes. 
3.1. The XML description method of security protocols 
From the related work, it can be seen that for the code automatic generation, the first problem that 
shall be solved is the formal description of security protocols, that is, selecting a suitable formal 
language that can clearly, accurately and flexibly describe the security attributes of protocols and 
communication sequences.
Based on XML, a formal description method is designed to translate security protocols into XML 
descriptions. The reason why XML is adopted is that, as a language that is independent of security formal 
analysis methods, it is simple, flexible, extensible and widely used. What’s more, XML is powerful in 
data description function, highly structured and verifiable, and the techniques to parse and process XML 
is mature. Consequently, XML is a suitable description language for the code generation. 
358   Xinghua Li et al. /  Procedia Environmental Sciences  10 ( 2011 )  356 – 362 
3.1.1 Structure of Security Protocols  
A security protocol is a sequence of messages exchanged between entities. And a security 
protocol mainly includes three parts, they are free variables, key initial information and message 
interaction sequences respectively, which is shown in Figure 3. Accordingly, the designed XML 
description is also divided into three parts: the free variables description, the key initial info 
description and the message interaction sequences description. As the components of a protocol 





















Figure 1. Structure of a security protocol 
3.1.2 The Grammar Rules 
In Table 1, the XML nodes and their attributes are designed which describe the ingredients of a 
security protocol in Figure 3. In general, the XML tags defined in Table 1 is enough for most 
security protocols. And even in the case that the tags are inadequate, it can be solved through 
appropriate complements.  
Now we use the XML tags to describe the three components in Figure 3: the free variable, the 
key initial information and the message interaction sequences. 
(1) The Free Variable Description 
There is only one FreeVariable node in each XML description documents, the child node of which 
consists of several Agent nodes and Nonce nodes, describing the entities and random numbers 
involved. The structure of FreeVariable is shown as follows: 
<FreeVariable> 
 <Agent IPAddress="..." port="..." actualName="...">...</Agent>üüEntity declarations
 <Nonce owner="...">...</Nonce>üüRandom value statement
</FreeVariable> 
(2) The Key Initial Information Description 
There is also only one KeyInit node in each XML description document, which is used to describe 
the key initial infomation of a security protocol. As shown in Figure 3, the key initial information 
includes the symmetric key, the asymmetric key and the MAC algorithm key, described by the 
Symcrypto node, the Pkcrypto node, and the MACcrypto node separately. There can be several 
nodes for each kind key, representing more than one keys of this kind used in a security protocol. 
The Knowledge node is somewhat special which is used to describe the public keys knowledge of an 
entity in the public key cryptography protocol. For example, in initialization, a Knowledge node can 
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be used to describe that one entity knows the public key of another entity, and there can also be more 
than one such kind of node. The structure of KeyInit is shown as follows: 
<KeyInit> 
<Symcrypto algorithm="..." share1="..." share2="..." SymKeyPathname="…" > 
</Symcrypto >üüSymmetric Key Description
  <Pkcrypto algorithm="..."owner="..."PKPathname="…"PRPathname="…"> 
 </Pkcrypto> üüAsymmetric Key Description
<Hash algorithm="..."/>üüHash Algorithm Description
 <MACcrypto algorithm="..." share1="..." share2="..." SymKeyPathname="…" > 
< /MACcrypto >üüMessage Authentication Code Description
 <Knowledge subject="..." object="..."/>üüPublic Key Knowledge of an Entity
</KeyInit> 
Table 1: XML Tags of ingredients in a Security Protocols 
(3) The Message Interaction Sequences Description 
The Message node is used to describe a message where the source, destination and sequence 
respectively represent the sender, the receiver and the sequence number of a message. The message 
interaction sequences can be defined by the following expressions: 
Message::=Plaintext | Ciphertext | MAC| Hash 




usedKey::=PKAgent| PRAgent | KAgentAgent… | MKAgentAgent… 
MessageList::=Message|(Message, MessageList)  
In the expression above, PKAgent and PRAgent respectively represent the public key and 
private key of an entity. For example, the public key and private key of the entity A can be expressed 
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as PKA and PRA. KAgentAgent… represents the shared key between two or more entities, for 
example, the shared key between entity A and B can be expressed as KAB. MKAgentAgent… 
represents the MAC algorithm key between two or more entities, for example, the shared key of 
MAC algorithm between entity A and B can be expressed as MKAB. 
From the expression above, it can be seen that a message includes plaintext (Nonce, Agent), 
MAC, Hash and ciphertext that includes the key and the messages to be encrypted. And a message 
can be many nests of plaintext, ciphertext, MAC and Hash. 
3.2. The design of the interpreter 
Figure 2. Code generation process 
In implementation, the structured XML is adopted to describe protocols, and the interpreter 
module parses the XML description document and generates source codes. The parsing process is to 
process the relevant nodes (e.g. Agent, Nonce, Pkcrypto, Message and MAC, etc.) and their 
attributes, specifically, to parse keywords. The CGenrator class, which implements the interpreter 
module, includes FreeVarGenerator, KeyInfoGenerator, BuildMsg, ParseMsg, Generator and other 
functions which parse the XML description document and generate the code. The process is shown 
in Figure 7. 
The following is a brief introduction of the major member functions in the CGenerator class: 
 (1) The FreeVarGenerator function parses the entities and random numbers of the node 
FreeVariable in the XML document and generates the initial code. 
 (2) The KeyInfoGenerator function parses the key initial information of the node KeyInit in the 
XML document and generates the initial code of the corresponding keys (e.g. the symmetric key, 
asymmetric key and MAC algorithm key).
 (3) The BuildMsg function parses the Message nodes in the XML document and constructs the 
message according to the description structure of each message to be sent, that is, to generate the 
construction code of a message. The ParseMsg function parses the received messages according to 
the structure of the Message node, generating the parsed code of a message. 
 (4) By invoking the FreeVarGenerator, KeyInfoGenerator, BuildMsg and ParseMsg functions, the 
Generator function generates codes of each participant entity, that is, generating the class of each 
participant entity (e.g. class A shown in Figure 5). 
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Among those functions, BuildMsg and ParseMsg are the most important. In order to better explain 
how to construct and parse a message. 
4. Scheme Analysis 
In this section, the characteristics and advantages of our scheme are first analyzed.Compared with 
the manual coding, our scheme can improve the design and development efficiency of a security protocol. 
Moreover, a great deal of labor cost is saved and the workload of programmers is reduced. At the same 
time, to some degree the code defects can be avoided and its security is improved. 
Compared with the existing schemes, ours has following advantages: 
(1) In the selection of the protocol description language, XML is adopted whose simplicity in 
grammar and concision in description makes it suitable for the carrier of information exchange. 
Compared with other formal analysis methods of security protocols, XML is more accurate and 
flexible which can provide users different algorithms and security operations to choose. The formal 
analysis methods (e.g. Spi calculus, strand space model and FDR) are not designed for the purpose 
of code generations, therefore, their description capability is limited, and can not be specific to the 
algorithm level and provides no ability for users to designate some an operation or algorithm. 
(2) Independent from the formal security analysis, our scheme can apply to any security protocols no 
matter what method is used in the design and analysis stage. Therefore, it is of good universality. 
(3) Our scheme has no requirements for users to master a formal security analysis methods, and it is 
easy for users to master XML. 
5. Conclusions 
An engineering realization method for security protocols is put forward. First, we design a 
description method of a security protocol. Then, a security protocol interpreter is designed and 
implemented which takes the description. Analysis indicates that our scheme has obvious advantages over 
the existing ones.  
Acknowledgements 
       This work was supported by the Major national S&T program(2011ZX03005-002)ˈthe National 
Natural Science Foundation of China(60872041,61072066), the Fundamental Research Funds for the 
Central Universities(JY10000903001, JY10000901034), the Open Research Fund from Shandong 
provincial Key Laboratory of Computer. 
362   Xinghua Li et al. /  Procedia Environmental Sciences  10 ( 2011 )  356 – 362 
References 
[1]D.Song. Athena: An Automatic Checker for Security Protocol Analysis. In 12th IEEE Computer Security Foundation 
Workshop, 1999. 
 [2]A.Perrig, D.Song. Looking for Diamonds in the Desert-Extending Automatic Protocol Generation to Three-Party 
Authentication and Key Agreement Protocols. In 13th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, 2000. 
[3]D.Song, A.Perrig and D.Phan. AGVI-Automatic Generation, Verification, and Implementation of Security Protocols. In 13th 
Conference on Computer Aided Verification (CAV), 2001. 
[4]D.Song, An Automatic Approach for Building Secure Systems. Dissertation, 2002. 
[5]F.Muller, J.Millen. Cryptographic protocol generation from CAPSL. SRI International, SRI Technical Report. SRI-CSL-01-
07, 2001. 
[6]IS. Abdullah, DA. Menascé. Protocol Specification and Automatic Implementation Using XML and CBSE. In Proceeding of 
Int. Conf. on Communications, Internet and Information Tech. (CIIT2003), 17-19 Nov. 03. 
